In this paper it is assumed that pairs of incommensurable theories are in fact comparable. This point of view leads us to accept that incommensurable theories deal with shared portions of the world. Ontosemantic conditions of comparability between two incommensurable theories are considered along the paper.

En este trabajo se asume: que una teoría factual es un sistema conceptual para representar parcelas deI mundo; que la principal manera de expresar tales sistemas es mediante el lenguaje; y que, consecuentemente, en la comparación de teorías rivales tienen importancia los factores de índole ontosemántica. Desde esa perspectiva se analizan dos problemas que surgen de la aceptación de la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad, a saber: a) el de establecer las condiciones ontosemánticas que dan sentido a la comparabilidad de teorías (...) inconmensurables; y b) el de la consideración de un enfoque ontosemántico compatible con el hecho de que algunas modificaciones en una teoría no conlleven variación de significado y referencia, mientras otras sí.In this work it is assumed: that a factual theory is a conceptual system for representing patches of the world; that the principal way of expressing a system of that sort is by means of language; and that, consequently, factors of ontosemantic kind are important for the comparison between rival theories. Given this perspective, two problems, whieh come up from the acceptance of the incommensurability thesis are analyzed: a) to establish the ontosemantic conditions that give sense to the comparability of incommensurable theories; and b) to consider an ontosemantic picture compatible with the fact that some modifications in a theory are not followd by variance of meaning and reference, while other modifications are. (shrink)

En este artículo se explicitan las doscaracterizaciones fundamentales dela inconmensurabilidad interteóricade cómo determinar lo que supuestamentecomparación interesante entre dos teoríasinconmensurables sólo tiene sentido.

We begin by highlighting some points related to Kuhn’s later thoughts on the incommensurability thesis and then show to what extent the standard version of the thesis given by the structuralist metatheory allows us to capture Kuhn’s ideas. Our main aim is to establish what constitutes the basis of comparability between incommensurable theories, even in cases of incommensurability with respect to theoretical and non-theoretical terms. We propose that comparability between incommensurable theories requires some connection between their respective ontologies that can (...) be captured by means of an ontological non-reductive relation. At this point, the structuralist notion of “echeloned partial substructure” may be of help. When the incommensurability is very drastic, the existence of ontological connections between the theories involved may only be evident by common terms of their non-characteristic vocabularies. So, this notion of non-characteristic vocabulary becomes relevant in our proposal. (shrink)

¿Es posible compatibilizar una suerte de relativismo epistémico con una defensa de la racionalidad científica? La profesora Pérez Ransanz, además de exponer con claridad la manera en que Thomas S. Kuhn adopta ese doble compromiso, intenta justificar la viabilidad de tal planteamiento. Este objetivo se inscribe en el marco de mostrar que en la reflexión filosófica de Kuhn sobre la ciencia, desde la aparición de La estructura de las revoluciones científica hasta las aportaciones previas a su fallecimiento en 1996, hay (...) continuidad, coherencia y un progresivo enriquecimiento de sus puntos de vista, por encima de pequeñas diferencias que efectivamente pueden encontrarse entre sus diferentes escritos. (shrink)

Temas actuales de Lógica y Filosofía Analítica 143 John Corcoran Notes on the Founding of Logics and Metalogic: Aristotle, Boole, and Tarski 177 Ignacio ...

En este trabajo se asume: que una teoría factual es un sistema conceptual para representar parcelas deI mundo; que la principal manera de expresar tales sistemas es mediante el lenguaje; y que, consecuentemente, en la comparación de teorías rivales tienen importancia los factores de índole ontosemántica. Desde esa perspectiva se analizan dos problemas que surgen de la aceptación de la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad, a saber: a) el de establecer las condiciones ontosemánticas que dan sentido a la comparabilidad de teorías (...) inconmensurables; y b) el de la consideración de un enfoque ontosemántico compatible con el hecho de que algunas modificaciones en una teoría no conlleven variación de significado y referencia, mientras otras sí.In this work it is assumed: that a factual theory is a conceptual system for representing patches of the world; that the principal way of expressing a system of that sort is by means of language; and that, consequently, factors of ontosemantic kind are important for the comparison between rival theories. Given this perspective, two problems, whieh come up from the acceptance of the incommensurability thesis are analyzed: a) to establish the ontosemantic conditions that give sense to the comparability of incommensurable theories; and b) to consider an ontosemantic picture compatible with the fact that some modifications in a theory are not followd by variance of meaning and reference, while other modifications are. (shrink)

This is the introduction to the special issue of the Spanish journal Ágora-Papeles de Filosofía (31/2, 2012) devoted to new Ibero-American contributions to metatheoretical structuralism.

The subject matter of this paper is the view that it is correct, in an absolute sense, to believe a proposition just in case the proposition is true. I take issue with arguments in support of this view put forward by Nishi Shah and David Velleman.

The paper argues against Sosa’s claim that sensitivity cannot be differentially supported over safety as the right requirement for knowledge. Its main contention is that, although all sensitive beliefs that should be counted as knowledge are also safe, some insensitive true beliefs that shouldn’t be counted as knowledge are nevertheless safe.

José L. Zalabardo puts forward a new interpretation of central ideas in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus concerning the structure of reality and our representations of it in thought and language. He presents the picture theory of propositional representation as Wittgenstein's solution to the problems that he had found in Bertrand Russell's theories of judgment. Zalabardo then attributes to Wittgenstein the view that facts and propositions are ultimate indivisible units, not the result of combining their constituents. This is Wittgenstein's solution to the (...) problem of the unity of facts and propositions. Finally, Zalabardo shows that Wittgenstein's views on the analysability of everyday propositions as truth functions of elementary propositions arise from his views on the epistemology of logic: this offers a new perspective on the nature of Tractarian analysis. (shrink)

To the sceptic's contention that I don't know that I have hands because I don't know that there is an external world, the Moorean replies that I know that there is an external world because I know that I have hands. Crispin Wright has argued that the Moorean move is illegitimate, and has tried to block it by limiting the applicability of the principle of the transmission of knowledge by inference—the principle that recognising the validity of an inference from known (...) premises generates knowledge of the conclusion. I argue that, in the presence of some plausible assumptions, blocking the Moorean move does not require limiting the applicability of the transmission principle. Then I argue against Jim Pryor's contention that the Moorean argument transmits evidential support from its premises to its conclusion. (shrink)

Information theoretic semantics proposes to construe predicate reference in terms of nomological relations between distal properties and properties of representational mental events. Research on the model has largely concentrated on the problem of choosing the nomological relation in terms of which distal properties are to be singled out. I argue that, in addition to this, an information theoretic account has to provide a specification of which properties of representational mental events will play a role in determining reference, qua bearers of (...) nomological relations. I contend that this task poses a serious additional challenge to the viability of the model. (shrink)

I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalism that ascribe foundational status to experiential beliefs. It can also be used to generate a (...) version of internalist foundationalism based on reliabilist principles. (shrink)

I discuss the account of logical consequence advanced in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I argue that the role that elementary propositions are meant to play in this account can be used to explain two remarkable features that Wittgenstein ascribes to them: that they are logically independent from one another and that their components refer to simple objects. I end with a proposal as to how to understand Wittgenstein's claim that all propositions can be analysed as truth functions of elementary propositions.

This volume comprises nine lively and insightful essays by leading scholars on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, focusing mainly on his early work.

En este trabajo me voy a centrar en el análisis de la poco conocida crítica de la teoría de las virtudes de David Hume llevada a cabo por el padre del Utilitarismo clásico, Jeremy Bentham. Este trabajo defiende que la perspectiva humeana en esa teoría, basada en la distinción primordial entre virtudes naturales y artificiales, no sólo es compatible con el utilitarismo clásico, a pesar de las críticas de Jeremy Bentham, sino que puede contribuir a mejorarlo y desarrollarlo por medio (...) de la sólida, compleja y plural visión de la moralidad que propone. (shrink)

I offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein's claim that Russell's theory of judgment fails to show that it's not possible to judge nonsense.

In this paper I assess the two central ingredients of Laurence BonJour’s position on empirical knowledge that have survived the transition from his earlier coherentist views to his current endorsement of the doctrine of the given: his construal of the problem of the epistemic regress and his rejection of an internalist solution to the problem. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a critical assessment of BonJour’s arguments against externalism. I argue that they fail to put real pressure on (...) externalism, as they rely on a highly questionable conception of epistemic rationality and responsibility. Then, more briefly, I take issue with BonJour’s endorsement of the irrelevance thesis—the claim that even if externalism were true it would not offer a satisfactory solution to the epistemic regress problem. I contend that he is not entitled to subscribe this thesis unless he is prepared to abandon his construal of the problem. (shrink)

Reliabilist accounts of knowledge are widely seen as having the resources for blocking sceptical arguments, since these arguments appear to rely on assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are rendered illegitimate by reliabilist accounts. The goal of this book is to assess the main arguments against the possibility of knowledge, and its conclusions challenge this consensus. The book articulates and defends a theory of knowledge that belongs firmly in the truth-tracking tradition, and argues that although the theory has the (...) resources for blocking the main standard lines of sceptical reasoning, there is a sceptical argument against which the theory offers no defence, as it doesn’t rely on any assumptions that the theory would render illegitimate. The book ends with the suggestion that the problem might have a metaphysical solution—that although the sceptical argument may make no illegitimate epistemological assumptions, it does rest on a questionable account of the nature of cognition. (shrink)

I discuss the idea that the objects of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are propertyless bare particulars, an idea defended by Leonard Goddard and Brenda Judge in their monograph, The Metaphysics of the Tractatus. I present the difficulties that Goddard and Judge raise for this construal concerning the idea that Tractarian objects have natures that determine their possibilities of combination, and I assess the solution they propose. I offer an alternative construal of the notion with which these difficulties can be overcome.

Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the only book-length work to have been published during his lifetime, continues to generate interest and scholarly debate. This volume of new essays showcases contemporary ideas on how to interpret the Tractatus and throws new light on some of its most challenging passages.

The paper deals with the interpretation of Wittgenstein's views on the power of occurrent mental states to sort objects or states of affairs as in accord or in conflict with them, as presented in the rule-following passages of the Philosophical Investigations. I shall argue first that the readings advanced by Saul Kripke and John McDowell fail to provide a satisfactory construal of Wittgenstein's treatment of a platonist account of this phenomenon, according to which the sorting power of occurrent mental states (...) is to be explained by reference to the mind's ability to grasp universals. I contend that the argument that Kripke extracts from Wittgenstein's discussion doesn't succeed in undermining the platonist position. Then I argue that McDowell's reading exhibits a more serious shortcoming: the position that he ascribes to Wittgenstein is indistinguishable from the platonist account. Then I put forward a proposal as to how to articulate the relationship between Wittgenstein's views and the platonist position. (shrink)

The paper deals with our ability to classify objects as being of a certain kind on the basis of information provided by the senses (empirical classification) and to ascribe empirical predicates to objects on the basis of these classificatory verdicts (empirical predication). I consider, first, the project of construing the episodes in which this ability is exercised as involving universals. I argue that this construal faces epistemological problems concerning our access to the universals that it invokes. I present the empiricist (...) strategy for dealing with these problems by appeal to sensory qualities, and argue that it rests on a mistake. Then I turn to sketching an account of our faculty of empirical classification and predication which doesn't invoke universals. The account takes as its starting point the nominalist construal of sense experience to be found in the work of C. I. Lewis and Nelson Goodman. I argue that this construal has the resources for explaining some of the central features of the practice of empirical predication. There are those who feel that our ability to understand general terms ... would be inexplicable unless there were universals as objects of apprehension. And there are those who fail to detect, in such appeal to a realm of entities over and above the concrete objects in space and time, any explanatory value. W. V. O. Quine, ‘Logic and the Reification of Universals’. (shrink)

The paper addresses the question whether semantic naturalism is undermined by the thought that semantic concepts are normative.

I argue that our procedures for determining whether ascriptions of a predicate represent things as being a certain way are ultimately pragmatic. Pragmatic procedures are not subject to validation by the referential procedure – determining whether there is a property playing the role of its referent. Predicates can represent even if we can't provide an independent identification of its referent. For these predicates, the speakers’ knowledge of how they represent objects as being would have to be construed in terms of (...) the ascription practices they associate with the predicates. The same approach can be applied to semantic predicates, such as ‘is representational’ or ‘refers to’. They can be treated as representational even if we can't provide an independent identification of their referents. The availability of this position undermines accounts of the referents of semantic predicates in naturalistic terms. (shrink)

In the recent literature on confirmation there are two leading approaches to the provision of a probabilistic measure of the degree to which a hypothesis is confirmed by evidence. The first is to construe the degree to which evidence E confirms hypothesis H as a function that is directly proportional to p and inversely proportional to p . I shall refer to this as the probability approach. The second approach construes the notion as a function that is directly proportional to (...) the true-positive rate – the probability of the evidence if the hypothesis is true, p – and inversely proportional to the false-positive rate – the probability of the evidence if the hypothesis is false, p . These reverse conditional probabilities – of the evidence on the truth or falsehood of the hypothesis – are sometimes known as likelihoods. I shall refer to the approach to confirmation that uses them as the likelihood approach.For each of these approaches, there are two obvious options as to how to define the confirmation function. The first is to define it as the difference between the magnitude that is treated as increasing confirmation or p ) and the magnitude that is treated as decreasing confirmation or p ). The second is to define confirmation as the quotient of these two magnitudes.This yields four different measures of confirmation, represented in the following table: Differences RatiosProbabilities PD = p – p1 PR = Graphic2Likelihoods LD = p – p3 LR = Graphic4All these measures agree on whether or not E provides some support for H. Intuitively, we want to say that E provides some support for H just in case learning that E is true would make us assign a higher probability to H, i.e. when p(H …. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I argue that some of the central doctrines of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be seen as addressing the twin problems of semantic unity and...

I endorse Kripke's (Wittgenstein's) conclusion that the standard of correct application required by the notion of rule-following can only be made sense of in terms of intersubjective agreement. This is not to be taken, as Kripke does, merely as providing assertibility conditions, but rather as a genuine account of what normativity consists in. As Blackburn has pointed out, this result entails that the notion of objective judgment is dependent, in a sense, on the shared inclinations of the members of the (...) community. But since the sceptical paradox admits of no noncommunal solution, it is the inclination-independence of the notion of objective judgment that has to be given up. (shrink)

I use some ideas of Keith DeRose's to develop an (invariantist!) account of why sceptical reasoning doesn't show that I don't know that I'm not a brain in a vat. I argue that knowledge is subject to the risk-of-error constraint: a true belief won’t have the status of knowledge if there is a substantial risk of the belief being in error that hasn’t been brought under control. When a substantial risk of error is present (i.e. beliefs in propositions that are (...) false in nearby worlds), satisfying the constraint requires bringing the risk under control. This is achieved either by sensitivity, i.e. you wouldn’t have the belief if it were false, or by identifying evidence for the proposition. However, when the risk of error is not substantial (i.e. beliefs in propositions that are not false in nearby worlds), the constraint is satisfied by default. My belief that I am not a brain in a vat is insensitive and I have no evidence for it, but since it is not false in nearby worlds, it satisfies the constraint by default. (shrink)

Es gibt also einen Neu-Fichteanismus. Nun, worin besteht er? Denn die deutliche Zunahme der Anwesenheit Fichtes in der Literatur, so beträchtlich sie auch sein mag, reicht nicht, um einen Begriff zu prägen. Lübbe stellt fest: »Zwischen 1890 und 1900 gibt es zu Fichtes Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie kaum mehr als 10 bemerkenswerte Titel. Zwischen 1900 und 1920 sind es gegen 200«. Das ist zwar viel, aber nicht sehr bedeutsam. Wenn wir die Rolle unserer wissenschaftlichen Veröffentlichungen im Leben einer Kulturgesellschaft relativieren, dann (...) entdecken wir, daß die Angaben, die Klaus Christian Köhnke in seiner Arbeit »Philosophische Begriffe in wissenschaftsinterner und -externer Kommunikation. Am Beispiel der Fichte-Festreden des Jahres 1862« vorstellt, viel entscheidender sind. Dort lesen wir nämlich, daß obwohl 1862 keine Monographie über Fichte verfaßt wurde, doch etwas viel Wichtigeres geschah: jenes Jahr stellte einen Wandel in den Beziehungen zwischen Philosophie, Universität und Gesellschaft dar. Diese Veränderungen bringen uns auf die Spur, um begriffliche Transformationen einschätzen zu können. Köhnke faßt wie folgt zusammen. (shrink)

Standard definitions of logical consequence for formal languages are atomistic. They take as their starting point a range of possible assignments of semantic values to the extralogical atomic constituents of the language, each of which generates a unique truth value for each sentence. In modal logic, these possible assignments of semantic values are generated by Kripke-style models involving possible worlds and an accessibility relation. In first-order logic, they involve the standard structures of model theory, as sets of objects from which (...) the extralogical symbols of the language receive their denotations. I argue that there is an alternative, holistic, approach to the task of defining logical consequence for a formal language. It specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for an assignment of truth values to all the sentences of the language to be compatible with the intended interpretation of its logical constants. It achieves this without invoking possible assignments of semantic values to the extralogical atomic constituents of the language, or the formal resources that are employed to generate these. I show how this approach can be successfully applied to modal propositional logic and to first-order logic, modal as well as nonmodal. I show that the holistic definitions of logical consequence that I supply for these languages are equivalent to the standard atomistic definitions. (shrink)

I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in Scepticism and Reliable Belief. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither true nor false when they ascribe (...) truth to a non-existent belief. I argue that the problem is inescapable if we construe SATs as ascribing the property of truth to a belief. Deflationism manages to avoid the problem of reflective knowledge, but it does so by violating alethic priority — the principle that our account of representation must be built on our account of truth. I argue that we can avoid the problem of reflective knowledge while preserving alethic priority with a pragmatist account of truth — according to which truth is explicated in terms of the rules that govern the practice of assessing judgments and related items as true or false. (shrink)

... on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 978–0– 19–969152–4 Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by MPG Books Group, ..

Volume 2, Issue 3, September 2018, Page 343-354.

I argue that a target of the rule - following considerations is the thought that there are mental episodes in which a consciously accessible item guides me in my decision to respond in a certain way when I follow a rule. I contend that Wittgenstein’s position on this issue invokes a distinction between a literal and a symbolic reading of the claim that these processes of guidance take place. In the literal sense he rejects the claim, but in the symbolic (...) sense he sees nothing wrong with it. I consider some arguments that Wittgenstein deploys against the literal sense of the claim. (shrink)